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Much of the environmental legislation administered by the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) pays little attention to the costs of
imposing various standards on industry. Indeed, it would be fair to say
that the majority of this legislation was drafted with the philosophy that
environmental objectives should dominate cost concerns.' The basic philos-
ophy underlying the writing of standards was the "command-and-control"
approach. Using this approach, federal and state regulators promulgated
rules which directed companies to use a particular technology to meet a
prescribed emission standard. Firms were provided very little latitude in
choosing alternatives to meet specific standards. Economists were quick to
point out that this "command-and-control" method of regulation was
quite expensive. Indeed, they performed a number of simulation studies
which indicated that dramatic cost savings could be achieved by allowing
firms more flexibility in meeting standards.'
Over the last decade, in response to these and other criticisms, EPA has
begun to experiment with a variety of reform measures aimed at provid-
ing companies with greater flexibility in the technologies they can choose
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to meet environmental standards.3 The most ambitious and far-reaching of
these reforms is the emissions trading policy which allows companies to
trade emission rights under certain conditions and thereby provides addi-
tional mechanisms for companies and states to work together to meet
ambient standards4 set forth in the Clean Air Act.' The basic rationale for
adopting this new approach is its potential to save a great deal of money
without sacrificing air quality objectives. For EPA, the policy represents a
radical departure from the dominant command-and-control paradigm.
The emissions trading policy has been characterized by EPA Adminis-
trator Lee Thomas as "one of EPA's most impressive accomplishments." 6
However, not everyone shares the Administrator's optimistic view. The
emissions trading policy has been the subject of heated, and sometimes
acrimonious, debate. Environmentalists are concerned that progress to-
wards meeting environmental quality objectives may be slowed, 7 while
proponents of market-based approaches to pollution problems argue that
this reform does not go far enough.' Most of the arguments to date are
based on rather vague, anecdotal impressions of the performance of the
emissions trading policy. Notably absent from the debate is a reasoned
assessment of actual program performance.
Richard Liroff's book, Reforming Air Pollution Regulation: The Toil
and Trouble of EPA's Bubble represents a major contribution to the eval-
uation of regulatory reform at EPA precisely because it takes an in-depth
look at how specific aspects of emissions trading were implemented. Well-
written and easily accessible, the book should be of interest to a wide
3. For example, a market was established in 1982 for the exchange of rights to include lead in
gasoline. See 47 Fed. Reg. 49,331 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
4. "Ambient standards specify permissible concentrations of pollutants in an area's air. These
standards are distinguishable from emission standards, which govern the amount of pollution allowed
from particular points." R. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOIL AND
TROUBLE OF EPA's BUBBLE 6n (1986) [hereinafter by page number]. See generally R. STEWART &
J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1978).
5. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).' See generally, R. Hahn & G. Hester, Where Did all the Markets
Go?: An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program 14 (Oct. 20, 1986) (on file with the Yale
Journal on Regulation) ("The elements of emissions trading have been, at various points in time,
added on to the existing regulatory system, revised, disallowed as a result of legal challenges, and
resurrected.").
6. L. Thomas, EPA Administrator, Memorandum re: Final Emissions Trading Policy 2 (undated
memorandum attached to Administrator's Decisions/Guidance to Staff Emissions Trading (Bubble)
Issues, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, May 19, 1986) (on file with author) [hereinafter cited
as Memorandum].
7. See, e.g., p. 2 (quoting Doniger, The Dark Side of the Bubble, ENVTL. F., July, 1985, at 33);
pp. 15, 98 (citing undated letter to Natural Resources Defense Council members from NRDC Execu-
tive Director John Adams).
8. See, e.g., Hahn and Noll, Implementing Tradable Emissions Permits, in REFORMING SOCIAL
REGULATION: ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC POLICY STRATEGIES 125 (L. Graymer & F. Thompson eds.
1982).
Vol. 4: 173, 1986
Bubble Policy
audience, including policy makers, reformers, and academics interested in
alternatives to command-and-control regulation.
I. An Overview of the Book
Liroff explains how the Clean Air Act and emissions trading actually
work by examining the laws and regulations and their implementation.
He also shows why emissions trading has been the subject of a great deal
of controversy. His exploration of the motivations of key actors and inter-
est groups provides an explanation for the highly polarized nature of the
discussion.
Liroff's review of the Clean Air Act raises several issues which have an
impact on the efficacy of emissions trading. In particular, he discusses the
distinction between new and old sources,9 the problems with developing
emissions inventories,' 0 and the use of modeling and analytical techniques
to demonstrate that progress will be made toward achieving ambient stan-
dards.1 He also provides an insightful description of the four basic ele-
ments that make up the emissions trading policy: bubbles,"3 banking,'"
offsets,"' and netting.'
The heart of Liroff's analysis is built on an in-depth study of the first
of these four elements-EPA's bubble policy. The bubble policy allows a
firm to treat an entire, multi-source facility as if it were a single source.'
The name is derived from the concept of a "bubble" enclosing the whole
facility. The result of the bubble is to allow the multi-source facility
greater flexibility in meeting emissions standards by providing an incen-
tive for firms to identify less expensive ways of achieving an aggregate
level of emissions which does not exceed the sum of emission limits for
individual sources within the bubble.' Specifically, Liroff carefully
reviews about one-third of the approximately forty bubbles which EPA
has proposed for approval."
A mixed picture emerges from Liroff's analysis of bubble policy. 9 On
the one hand, based on reports of participating firms, the cost savings
9. Pp. 35-60, 61-103, 105-34.
10. Pp. 10, 20.
11. Pp. 17, 28-29, 61-99.
12. Pp. 4 passim.
13. P. 7.
14. Pp. 6-7.
15. Pp. 6, 117-34.




19. Pp. xvi-xvii, 97-103 (summaries of effect of bubble policy).
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resulting from bubbles have been impressive,2" and the effect on environ-
mental quality appears to have been small."' Some bubbles have sped pol-
lution abatement, producing reductions in emissions faster than would
have occurred in response to conventional control requirements.22 On the
other hand, other bubbles used credits for reducing emissions which were
obtained from plant closures that would have occurred anyway,23 or from
past responses to conventional control requirements.24 Interestingly, the
bubble policy appears to have resulted in little technological innovation.25
Given the large reduction in pollution control costs and the small
impact on environmental quality, one might wonder why the bubble pol-
icy generates such controversy. Liroff's book provides a cogent description
of the political interests involved in shaping the evolution of emissions
trading policy. The roles of different groups within and outside the agency
are examined, and Liroff offers a framework for understanding varying
attitudes. Environmentalists, he argues, oppose emissions trading because
they believe it will slow environmental progress." They tend to feel more
comfortable applying command-and-control approaches which provide less
flexibility over a company's choice of control equipment. 7 Groups
opposed to the command-and-control philosophy, however, argue that al-
ternative systems can achieve the best of both worlds-a cleaner environ-
ment at a lower cost.2 8
As one might expect, industry and environmentalists find themselves
battling over these issues in court. Accordingly, another central actor in
the evolution of emissions trading policy has been the court system. Key
judicial decisions involving emissions trading have served to increase the
uncertainty associated with the definition of the property rights that can
be traded.2 Liroff's analysis of the court's role in defining emissions trad-
ing provides insight into the forces which generate these conflicts.
20. The number most frequently cited for cost savings from bubbles is $800 million. P. 62 (quot-
ing EPA Emissions Trading Status Report 1 (1985)). It is difficult to place error bounds on this
number, but Liroffs analysis of individual cases supports the view that the cost savings have been
substantial P. 99. For a more comprehensive review of the cost savings resulting from emissions trad-
ing activities, see R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 5, at 20, 22.
21. See generally pp. xvi-xvii, 98-102 (evaluations of Liroff's case studies).
22. Pp. xvii, 100.
23. Pp. 98-99, 102.
The issue of plant closure has been controversial because it has sparked the debate over who owns the
property right, and what the appropriate duration of that right should be.
24. Pp. xvi-xvii, 98-99.
25. Pp. xvii, 100.
26. Pp. 2, 15, 98-99.
27. Pp. 11-13 (discussing various approaches to emissions trading).
28. Id.
29. In turn, the agency has tended to de-emphasize the explicit nature of the property right. See
infra text accompanying note 47. For an overview of important court decisions, see pp. 26-27.
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The principal strength of the book is its concern with the way the
world really works as opposed to some theoretical ideal. Just as it is
important to point out the strengths and deficiencies of command-and-
control regulation, it is also important to point out the relative merits of
alternative reforms as they are applied in practice. Liroff's analysis of the
bubble policy provides the best description to date of how the program
actually works.
After studying a particular set of policies in detail, it is always tempting
to end with a proposal or series of proposals for reforming the policy in
question. This book is no exception. The final chapter outlines a proposal
for modifying emissions trading.30 This is perhaps the weakest point of
the book, not because the proposal is necessarily flawed, but rather
because the presentation fails to sensitize the reader to the fact that reform
proposals for this particular policy will vary dramatically depending upon
the objectives that are viewed as desirable. For example, a reform aimed
at reducing pollution control expenditures while maintaining environmen-
tal quality would look quite different from a reform aimed at avoiding
any degradation in environmental quality that might result from introduc-
ing greater flexibility in the system. While Liroff considers a single
reform with a specific orientation, it is also important to identify the range
of possible reforms.
The primary elements of Liroff's reform proposal include: (1) tighten-
ing trading rules;81 (2) developing better data on the likely performance of
state programs aimed at meeting ambient standards;3" (3) performing
periodic evaluations of trading activities at the state level; 3 (4) instituting
a "truth in trading" program that would provide information on actual
environmental impacts;8 ' (5) introducing limited trading for new and
modified sources;" and (6) improving emissions inventories and emissions
monitoring.36
While this is a well-crafted proposal, it is by no means the only way to
proceed. Elements I and 4 of Liroffs proposal would place further limita-
tions on trading by changing the rules governing transactions and raising
the costs of trading. Unfortunately, the rationale behind introducing sig-
nificant additional safeguards to ensure that each trade will result in an
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indicates that emissions increases have been the exception rather than the
rule in the case of bubbles.37 Moreover, he does not believe that netting
has resulted in major changes in environmental quality.3 8 The only ap-
parent rationale for imposing more stringent environmental safeguards is
to increase the credibility of the program with environmentalists.3 9
Elements 2, 3, and 6 of Liroff's proposal would provide better informa-
tion on the scope and impact of trading activities. Liroff's call for addi-
tional information is well-founded. The central focus of his analysis is on
the federal bubble policy. However, an independent study reveals that
bubbles are probably one of the smaller elements in emissions trading."'
The primary reason the bubble program receives so much attention is be-
cause data are routinely collected on some bubbles at the federal level.
Elements 2 and 6 of Liroff's proposal are also fairly standard proposals
for gaining a better understanding of how well states are meeting air
quality objectives. Because this is where activity takes place, an under-
standing of the state and local role in air quality regulation is important
for designing and evaluating reform proposals.
The only element of the proposal aimed at increasing flexibility is num-
ber 5. Introducing limited trading for new and modified sources is likely
to have a salutary impact on pollution control expenditures without lead-
ing to major changes in environmental quality.
II. Whither Regulatory Reform?
It is important to recognize that proposals to reform emissions trading
inevitably involve tradeoffs and constraints. At a general level, emissions
trading affects both environmental quality and the individual and aggre-
gate cost of achieving different emission levels. There is an implicit trade-
off between reducing costs and improving environmental quality. This is
not to say that both goals cannot be furthered; however, at some point, the
two will come into conflict with each other. Moreover, in designing a sys-
tem where the actual effects are uncertain and information about the vari-
ous program elements is quite limited, it makes sense to view these trade-
offs in probabilistic terms."'
37. See generally pp. 61-103 (discussion of implementation of bubble policy and its effect on
emissions).
38. But see pp. 121-23 (discussing a less certain evaluation of netting on attainment areas). For a
discussion of nonattainment areas, see p. 133.
39. Pp. 136-44 (discussing improvements in the program that increase the program's credibility).
40. See R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 5, at 33.
41. Suppose for example, that the effects of a policy are measured in terms of their impact on
costs and environmental quality. Then one can characterize the impacts of this policy in terms of a
probability distribution over costs and environmental quality.
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Rather than study a particular reform, as Liroff did, it is useful to
examine a variety of reform proposals, some of which are more likely to
promote environmental objectives, and others which focus more on
providing companies with incentives to achieve cost savings.' Given the
current structure of emissions trading, it may even be possible to design
reforms which have a high probability of achieving significant cost savings
and increasing environmental quality."' In addition to designing reform
proposals that have an immediate impact, it is important to explore
reform proposals that would enable us to learn about the full potential of
emissions trading for reducing costs and improving environmental quality.
Such a proposal could include experimentation in a limited geographic
area for a single pollutant, placing minimal restrictions on trading, while
still promoting environmental quality."'
As Liroff recognizes, understanding the theoretical scope for policy
design is important; however, it is equally important to have a good grasp
of the political constraints imposed on program design. Analysts schooled
in focusing on policy outcomes tend to reduce the causes of the conflict to
a battle over measurable results, such as cost and environmental quality.
However, Liroff's analysis reveals that the issues are not so straightfor-
ward, and involve fundamental differences in values over process as well
as outcome.'" These differences ultimately impose additional constraints
on the policy process. Because there are major differences in the perspec-
tives of important interest groups, the emissions trading policy represents
a fascinating case study in politics.
Political reaction to the policy has been decidedly mixed. Environmen-
talists have tended to be skeptical of emissions trading policy, arguing that
environmental quality objectives have been sacrificed in the name of eco-
nomic efficiency. They assert that the program merely serves as another
loophole for industry to evade regulations. However, there is a deeper
sense in which environmentalists oppose reforms of this type. A
42. The most recent draft of the EPA emission policy falls into the former category. See Memo-
randum, supra note 6. Hahn & Hester have developed an alternative proposal which falls into the
latter category. Hahn & Hester, supra note 5, at 64. For a review of both of these proposals along
with a more detailed analysis of Liroff's proposal, see id. at 58.
43. One approach which could reduce costs while promoting environmental quality is to reduce
some of the uncertainties for firms engaging in emissions trading while, at the same time, improving
the information which provides the baseline from which Emission Reduction Credits (ERCs) are
calculated. For example, improvements in data on actual emissions could simultaneously reduce some
of the uncertainty for firms about their potential to create emission reduction credits, and decrease the
probability that firms will use credits which are based on unrealistic estimates of emissions.
44. Hahn & Noll, Designing a Market for Tradable Emissions, in REFORM OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL RE(G.ut.AIoN 119 (W. Magat ed. 1982) (examining some issues in designing such a proposal in
context of specific pollution problem.
45. For a penetrating discussion of these issues see S. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?:
ECONOMISrS AND rHE ENVIRONMENT (1981).
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fundamental premise underlying emissions trading is that explicit trading
of emissions rights is an acceptable activity. This is not a premise which
many environmentalists will accept, even if it can be shown that such
activity will lead to substantial improvements in environmental quality.
The reasons for this resistance are complex. For some, it is an issue of
morality-clean air is viewed as a basic inalienable right which is not for
sale at any price. Even for those who do not view this moral position as
absolute, there is an important symbolic issue at stake: Allowing firms to
trade emission rights sends a message that decisions about tradeoffs be-
tween economics and environmental quality can be left to the polluters. As
a result of these concerns, environmentalists tend to view emissions trad-
ing as a radical departure from the status quo.
In contrast, for advocates of more flexible approaches-most notably
economists-the emissions trading policy represents an incremental re-
form. When measured in terms of its potential relative to a smoothly func-
tioning market in emissions rights, the cost savings from emissions trading
have been small.""
These conflicting views have led regulators to create a set of policies
which are specifically designed to de-emphasize the explicit nature of the
property right.' 7 As a consequence, most transactions in the emissions
trading program involve trades between emissions sources within a single
company. Arms-length trades between firms are the exception rather than
the rule.48
One key interest group absent from the preceding discussion is "indus-
try." What interests does industry have? It is generally assumed that
industry wishes to reduce its expenditures on environmental controls. Less
widely recognized is the fact that industry also has a strong preference for
greater certainty in environmental regulation. Thus, the reduction in costs
that can be achieved under emissions trading policies may not be worth
the additional uncertainty that is created by participating in the program.
While sweeping generalities of this type are always suspect, it is possible
to observe industry behavior under the emissions trading program.49 It is
clear from such observations that compliance deadlines are a prime
motivator in getting industry to use emissions trading options.50 This
46. R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 5, at 53 (providing further support for this view based on
low level of trading between firms).
47. For a discussion of the judicial role in interpreting this policy, see supra text accompanying
note 29.
48. More trades between different companies would imply greater cost savings and lower barriers
to starting new businesses and expanding old ones. Their implications for environmental quality are
unclear.
49. R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 5, at 16.
50. Id. at 31.
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suggests a model of behavior in which businesses are not likely to explore
new regulatory alternatives unless they are in a situation where a change
from the status quo is inevitable. The conventional mechanism for chang-
ing the status quo is to introduce new regulatory requirements along with
a compliance deadline. However, a deadline may not, in itself, be suffi-
cient to induce a change in behavior. Firms must also believe that the
regulations will be enforced in a timely manner. If firms do not believe
that a regulation has "teeth," they will be less inclined to comply with the
deadline.
5 1
While Liroff's case study of the bubble policy underscores the potential
and limitations of regulatory reform, it also serves as a good example of
how little we know about the nature of environmental reforms aimed at
increasing efficiency. In the case of emissions trading, there is precious
little information on which to evaluate the performance of the program. If
EPA is interested in gaining a balanced picture of the effects of innovative
policies, it needs to collect information on all four elements of emissions
trading-bubbles, banking, offsets, and netting. Before making sweeping
proposals for regulatory reform, it behooves us to have at least a vague
understanding of the overall performance of each of the different elements
of the emissions trading program. Liroff explains the evolution and struc-
ture of these elements, but with the exception of the bubble, only provides
a cursory review of their performance.
At present, information is systematically collected only for bubbles,
while netting, banking, and offset policies for emissions trading have
received less attention. Placing primary emphasis on bubbles, however,
can provide a misleading picture of the scope for regulatory reform. Net-
ting, which involves trading with modified sources, appears to have been
used much more frequently than bubbles, which involves trading with ex-
isting sources. 2 Netting has probably resulted in much higher cost savings
to firms than bubbles." The environmental impact of netting, however, is
probably small. 5 ' Recent work highlights the need to improve the quality
and quantity of information that is centrally collected in order to make a
51. During the tenure of Administrator Burford at EPA, there were many allegations that en-
forcement activity was severely curtailed. If this were the only change, then one would expect to see a
corresponding drop in emissions trading activity. However, if the environmental standards for emis-
sions trading activity were also relaxed during this period, then this would have had a salutary impact
on trading activity. For a general discussion of problems in compliance during this period, see W.
DRAYTON, AMERICA'S Toxic PRO'rlriON GAP, (1984).
52. R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 5, at 51.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 41-42.
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reasoned assessment of the actual effect these programs have on environ-
mental quality and cost savings."
Another constructive area for study which EPA might wish to explore
is how differences in the administration of programs affect outcomes.
There are dramatic differences in the implementation of the various pro-
grams in terms of federal oversight. It is an open question as to how the
division of responsibility between federal, state, and local authorities
affects the evolution and performance of programs. One of the reasons the
bubble policy may be less active than the netting policy is because states
and local authorities have more control over netting. Bubbles generally
require federal oversight whereas netting does not.
One fruitful approach for gaining insights into the effect of giving states
greater autonomy is to examine the "generic bubble policy." Under the
existing bubble policy, states have two options. If they do not submit a set
of formal rules accepted by EPA for approving bubbles, they must revise
and resubmit their formal plan for meeting ambient standards each time a
bubble is proposed to EPA for approval." If they do submit formal rules
which are approved by EPA, they can approve bubbles without going
through the EPA review process each time. 57 Bubbles approved under
state rules are commonly called "generic bubbles." The principal advan-
tage of generic bubbles is that they reduce the level of administrative red
tape by reducing federal oversight. The level of bubble activity is signifi-
cantly higher in states with generic bubbles. 8 It would be useful to know
how bubbles with required federal oversight compare to bubbles approved
by states which permit generic bubbles, in terms of their effect on environ-
mental quality and cost savings.
Conclusion
Emissions trading is likely to remain a controversial issue. Much of the
controversy stems from fundamental differences about the nature of prop-
erty rights. Economists have tended to view the property rights issue too
simplistically. While it is possible to reduce the issue to differences in
expectations of how various programs will affect environmental quality
and costs, this does not, in my view, adequately capture some of the con-
cerns of environmentalists. Allowing emission rights to enter more directly
into the domain of market activity can and does affect their "intrinsic"
value to different groups, as well as their monetary value. While this
55. See R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 5.
56. Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076, 15,086 (1982).
57. Id. at 15,084.
58. R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 5, at 32.
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poses some difficult measurement problems for welfare economists, it
helps to explain the widespread resistance we have seen to the use of more
flexible approaches in achieving environmental objectives.
A key contribution of Richard Liroff's book is that it describes and
explains a particularly important regulatory reform. It should provide a
fertile base from which to build more effective reform proposals. An im-
portant challenge for future research is to begin to synthesize these find-
ings in an effort to understand better why particular reforms are chosen
in specific situations and how they are likely to perform. 9 Reforming Air
Pollution Regulation: The Toil and Trouble of EPA's Bubble represents
one of the first contributions toward developing some of these insights.
59. There are a wide array of incentive-based institutions that have recently been adopted in
several industrialized nations. The introduction of these reforms provides researchers with a unique
opportunity to examine how these policies compare, and in particular, to develop theories on why
some policies have been effective while others have not.

